Ideation
Phase 0 of the playbook: finding a problem worth testing, choosing one idea in at most a week, and handing a one-page problem hypothesis plus 20 names to validation. It covers where good ideas come from, which ones to avoid, how to score and size them, the "why now?" test, and when to kill an idea. Attributed advice from Paul Graham and YC partners is summarized here and collected on the y-combinator sheet; Peter Thiel's "secrets" framing is on the peter-thiel sheet.
Entry criteria and timebox
| Item | Phase 0: Ideation |
|---|---|
| Entry criteria | you want to build something; you may have zero ideas, one pet idea, or too many |
| Question it answers | which problem is worth a week or two of validation? |
| Timebox | ≤ 1 week (5 working days); see the day plan in the playbook |
| Artifacts produced | idea list; scoring matrix; problem hypothesis one-pager; ranked riskiest assumptions; list of 20 people to talk to |
| Exit criteria | one idea chosen, its one-pager written, 20 named people, at least 5 interviews booked |
| Biggest risk | endless ideation; choosing a made-up or tarpit idea because it sounds exciting |
Where good ideas come from
The canonical source is Paul Graham's essay How to Get Startup Ideas (opens in a new tab) (November 2012). Its opening line: "The way to get startup ideas is not to try to think of startup ideas. It's to look for problems, preferably problems you have yourself."
| Idea from the essay | What Graham says | What it means for you |
|---|---|---|
| Three shared traits | the best ideas are "something the founders themselves want, that they themselves can build, and that few others realize are worth doing" | score on all three, not just the first |
| Made-up ideas | YC calls plausible-sounding invented ideas "made-up" or "sitcom" startup ideas (his example: a social network for pet owners) | if the idea sounds like a TV writer invented it, distrust it |
| Notice, don't think up | "The verb you want to be using with respect to startup ideas is not 'think up' but 'notice.'" Ideas that grow out of the founders' own experience are organic | keep a problem journal; mine your own work |
| Live in the future | quoting Paul Buchheit and combining it with Pirsig: "Live in the future, then build what's missing." | work at the leading edge of a changing field; the gaps you hit are the ideas |
| Don't sit down to brainstorm | a "direct frontal attack" (sitting down to try to think of ideas) is less effective than a background process noticing gaps and anomalies | brainstorming produces the same ideas everyone else produces |
| Wells, not craters | start with something a small number of people want urgently ("narrow and deep, like a well"), not something many people want a little | 20 people desperate beats 20,000 mildly interested |
| Schlep and unsexy filters | your mind filters out ideas that involve tedious work or unglamorous markets; "Make something unsexy that people will pay you for." | deliberately look at the boring, painful, regulated work |
| Expertise raises standards | "If you're a database expert, don't build a chat app for teenagers (unless you're also a teenager)." | your judgment is only good in domains you know |
Schlep blindness. Graham's separate essay Schlep Blindness (opens in a new tab) (January 2012) defines a schlep as "a tedious, unpleasant task" and argues that programmers' unconscious filters hid obvious opportunities for years: payments were painful for everyone, yet few tried to fix them until Stripe. His summary: "A company is defined by the schleps it will undertake." For a technical founder, the schleps are usually sales, compliance, integrations with ugly legacy systems, and operations. Those are exactly where the uncontested problems are.
Organic ideas dominate. YC partner Jared Friedman's Startup School talk "How to Get and Evaluate Startup Ideas" (2022) looked at where YC's most successful companies got their ideas and found that most (roughly 70% of the top 100, by his count) came organically rather than from deliberate brainstorming. He also names the common mistakes: a solution in search of a problem (SISP), tarpit ideas, jumping into the first idea without evaluating it, and waiting for a perfect idea.
For ambition, not for copying. Graham's Frighteningly Ambitious Startup Ideas (opens in a new tab) (March 2012) lists seven: a new search engine, replace email, replace universities, internet drama, the next Steve Jobs, bring back Moore's law, and ongoing diagnosis. Read it to calibrate how big ideas can be, not as a menu for a 6-week MVP.
Tarpit ideas and made-up ideas
YC partners Dalton Caldwell and Michael Seibel coined tarpit ideas in a 2022 video ("Avoid These Tempting Startup Ideas", followed by "Tarpit Ideas: The Sequel"). Paraphrasing: a tarpit idea is one that looks obviously good, seems easy, and appears unclaimed, but has been tried many times and fails for structural reasons that aren't visible from the outside. The idea seems open not because nobody noticed it, but because everyone who tried got stuck.
| Warning sign | Why it's a warning | Test |
|---|---|---|
| "I'm surprised nobody has built this" about a common consumer problem | many have; they failed quietly | search for dead startups and Show HN posts for the same idea |
| everyone you describe it to says "cool, I'd use that" | cheap enthusiasm is the tarpit's lure | ask when they last tried to solve it and what they paid |
| the problem is mild and occasional (deciding what to do this weekend, discovering new music) | low urgency means low retention | would anyone notice if it disappeared? |
| value depends on network effects from day 1 | empty networks are worthless; cold-start kills them | can the first 10 users get value with nobody else on it? |
| "X for Y" with no insight about Y | a made-up idea wearing a proven model's clothes | what do you know about Y that the incumbents don't? |
| you started from a technology ("something with LLMs") | a solution in search of a problem | name the person and the painful moment first |
Tarpits are not forbidden. They require a specific answer to "why did the others fail, and why will we not?" If you can't write that answer in two sentences, move on.
Idea sources
| Source | What to look for | Example prompt | Strength | Trap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Your own pain | recurring annoyances you've hacked around | "What did I build a script for this year?" | strong founder–market fit; you are user 1 | you may be the only one |
| Your job's workflows | spreadsheets, copy-paste, manual reconciliations, approval chains | "Why doesn't someone make x? If someone made x we'd buy it in a second." (Graham's trick, from the essay) | buyers with budgets; clear value | employer IP clauses; check your contract |
| New technology enablers | things that became possible or cheap recently | "What costs 100× less than 3 years ago?" | genuine "why now" | SISP: technology first, problem later |
| Regulatory change | new obligations with deadlines | "Who must comply with a new rule by a date?" | forced demand, urgency | slow sales; legal risk |
| Marketplaces with friction | fragmented supply, opaque pricing, long lead times | "Where do buyers still phone around for quotes?" | large prizes | chicken-and-egg; tarpit risk |
| Unbundling | one feature of a big tool used intensely by a niche | "Which tab of this suite do people live in?" | clear scope; proven demand | incumbent copies the feature |
| Re-bundling | users stitching 4 tools together for one job | "What does the Zapier chain look like?" | real workflow evidence | integration schlep |
| Proven models in new niches | a business that works in one vertical or country | "Who is the X for dentists / for Germany?" | demand is proven | needs niche insight, or it's a made-up idea |
| Dying or broken industries | incumbents losing their reason to exist | Graham: look for industries "that are dying, or deserve to" | large, motivated customers | slow to change; long sales cycles |
Ideation techniques
| Technique | How | Output | Time |
|---|---|---|---|
| Problem journal | each day note gaps and anomalies you hit (Graham suggests exactly this in a footnote to the essay: "Not startup ideas, just the raw gaps and anomalies") | a list of real problems with dates | 5 min/day, ongoing |
| 100-ideas list | write 100 problems or ideas in one sitting; the first 30 are obvious, the interesting ones appear after | raw volume to filter | 2–3 h |
| "What do you know that others don't?" | list non-obvious truths from your work, hobbies or background (Thiel's "secrets" framing; see peter-thiel) | insight-based ideas | 1 h |
| Jobs-to-be-Done framing | rewrite each idea as "When ___, I want to ___, so I can ___" and name what people "hire" today | ideas framed as progress, not features | 10 min/idea |
| Trend and tech-shift scan | list 5 recent shifts (technology, regulation, behavior, cost curves); for each, who is newly underserved | "why now" candidates | 1–2 h |
| Constraint prompts | force variety: "only for accountants", "must work offline", "must cost under a coffee a month", "only B2B, only boring" | escapes from the obvious | 30 min |
| Friedman's recipes | from the YC talk: start from team expertise; problems you've had; things you wish existed; recent changes in the world; new variants of recent successes; interview people in a chosen area; find a big broken industry | structured search when you have no organic idea | 1–2 h |
| Talk to people in an area | pick a domain you can access and interview practitioners about their week before you have any idea | organic ideas you didn't have | 3–5 calls |
For a TypeScript/Next.js/Postgres developer, the highest-yield sources are usually developer tooling you've wished for, and the internal tools at past jobs that non-engineers struggled with. Both give you founder–market fit and reachable users.
Evaluating ideas
Friedman's talk lists ten questions to ask of any idea (paraphrased):
| # | Question | What a good answer looks like |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Founder–market fit: is this a good idea for your team? | you have domain knowledge, access to users, or the skills that matter most |
| 2 | How big is the market? | large now, or small but growing fast |
| 3 | How acute is the problem? | people are hacking together workarounds or paying for bad solutions |
| 4 | Is there competition? | usually yes, and that's fine; you need an insight they lack |
| 5 | Do you want this yourself, or know people who do? | named people, not "people like" |
| 6 | Did this recently become possible or necessary? | a specific change: technology, regulation, behavior |
| 7 | Is there a successful proxy? | a company doing something similar in another market |
| 8 | Would you work on it for years? | you'd want to, even when it gets boring |
| 9 | Is it scalable? | not purely a services business in disguise (unless that's what you want) |
| 10 | Is it a good idea space? | a space where pivots are likely to land on other good ideas |
He also names three counterintuitive signs of a good idea: it's hard to get started on, it's in a boring space, and it has existing competitors.
Scoring matrix
Score 1–5 on each criterion, multiply by the weight, sum. The matrix is a tool for making your reasoning explicit and comparing ideas consistently, not an oracle. Change the weights to reflect your goals (an indie business weights willingness to pay and founder–market fit more; a venture-scale bet weights market size more), but set them before scoring.
IDEA SCORING MATRIX Date: ______
Score each 1 (bad) - 5 (excellent). Weighted = score x weight.
Criterion Wt | Idea A | Idea B | Idea C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Founder-market fit 3 | | |
Problem acuteness 3 | | |
Want it myself / know people who do 2 | | |
Can reach first 20 users this week 2 | | |
Evidence of willingness to pay 2 | | |
Would work on it for years 2 | | |
Why now (specific recent change) 1 | | |
Market size (bottom-up) 1 | | |
Competition shape (gap exists) 1 | | |
Low tarpit / made-up risk 1 | | |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL (max 90) 18 | | |
Kill any idea scoring 1 on acuteness or reachability.Worked example: three ideas scored
A backend-leaning TypeScript/Postgres developer with six years at SaaS companies scores three ideas. The scores are illustrative judgments, not data.
- A. Migration safety checker: a CI check that flags risky Postgres schema migrations (locks, table rewrites, missing concurrent index builds) before they reach production, for small SaaS teams.
- B. AI meal planner: a consumer app that plans weekly meals and shopping lists.
- C. Clinic admin tool: scheduling and invoicing for independent physiotherapists.
| Criterion | Wt | A score | A weighted | B score | B weighted | C score | C weighted |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Founder–market fit | 3 | 5 | 15 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 6 |
| Problem acuteness | 3 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 12 |
| Want it / know people who do | 2 | 5 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| Reach first 20 this week | 2 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| Evidence of willingness to pay | 2 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 |
| Would work on it for years | 2 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| Why now | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Market size (bottom-up) | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| Competition shape | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Low tarpit / made-up risk | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 |
| Total (max 90) | 18 | 67 | 33 | 54 |
Reading it:
- A wins on fit and reach. The founder is the user, knows 20 people with the problem, and can judge quality. Its weakness is acuteness: teams may see migration failures as rare. That becomes the riskiest assumption to test first.
- C is the dark horse. Higher acuteness and clearer willingness to pay (clinics already pay for software), but weak founder–market fit and access. Park it with a note; revisit if the founder can get 5 physio interviews quickly.
- B is killed. Consumer, low urgency, crowded, no founder insight, weak willingness to pay: the tarpit profile. A high "why now" score doesn't rescue it.
- Decision: take A into validation for 1–2 weeks with pre-set kill criteria; keep C as the fallback.
Problem, solution and market risk
Every idea carries three kinds of risk. Validation should attack them in this order, because each is cheaper to test than the next and a failure early saves all the later work.
| Risk | Question | Cheapest test | Phase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Problem risk | does the problem exist, and is it painful enough to act on? | interviews about past behavior | 1 |
| Market risk | will enough reachable people pay (or switch) for a solution? | landing page, pre-sale, letters of intent | 1 |
| Solution risk | does our solution solve it well enough that people use it again? | prototype tests, concierge, Wizard of Oz | 2–3 |
| Technical risk | can we build it at all? | a spike, a prototype | 2–3 |
Technical founders habitually test technical risk first because it is the fun one, and it is rarely the one that kills the company. If you are unsure whether the thing can be built, do a one-day spike during ideation and move on.
Founder–market fit
Founder–market fit is how well your specific knowledge, access and motivation match the market. It matters because in the first six weeks your only unfair advantages are insight and access.
| Dimension | Strong | Weak |
|---|---|---|
| Knowledge | you've done the job, or built tools for people who do | you read about the industry last week |
| Access | you can get 20 target users on a call this week | you'd have to cold-email strangers in an unfamiliar industry |
| Credibility | the buyer trusts you on the topic | you'd have to explain why a developer is selling to them |
| Motivation | you care about the problem, not just the business | you picked it off a "trending startup ideas" list |
| Judgment | you can tell good solutions from bad ones | you can't (Graham's database-expert-building-a-chat-app point) |
Weak fit is not fatal, but it adds weeks. Fix it by partnering with a domain expert, or by spending the validation phase learning the domain before building anything.
Market sizing done bottom-up
Top-down TAM is theatre. "The global healthcare software market is $X billion; if we get 1%…" tells you nothing about whether anyone will buy your product, and every investor has heard it. Bottom-up sizing counts customers you could actually reach and multiplies by a price they would actually pay. It takes 30 minutes and it changes decisions.
| Term | Bottom-up definition |
|---|---|
| TAM (total addressable market) | every customer who could conceivably use this × annual price |
| SAM (serviceable available market) | the subset your product and channels can actually serve (geography, language, segment) × annual price |
| SOM (serviceable obtainable market) | the share of SAM you can realistically win in 3–5 years × annual price |
Worked example (idea A)
All counts below are assumptions for illustration; in real use, each line needs a source or a stated method (for example, counting companies in a public directory, job postings mentioning the technology, or members of a community).
BOTTOM-UP SIZING: Postgres migration safety checker
Price assumption: 49 USD per team per month
= 588 USD per year (all figures USD)
TAM All software teams running Postgres in production
Assume 200,000 teams worldwide x 588 = 117.6M/yr
SAM Teams of 2-20 engineers, English-speaking, deploying
via CI, no dedicated DBA
Assume 20,000 teams x 588 = 11.8M/yr
SOM Share won in 3 years through content, dev communities,
GitHub marketplace: assume 1% of SAM = 200 teams
x 588 = 117,600/yr
Reading: a decent indie business, not a venture-scale one on
its own. Decide which one you want BEFORE validation. If
venture scale: test whether the price can be 5-10x higher for
larger teams, or whether it expands into a broader product.What bottom-up sizing tells you that top-down doesn't:
- Whether you can name the customers. If you can't say how you'd count them, you can't say how you'd reach them.
- Whether the price makes sense. 200 customers at $588 a year is a salary, not a company; 200 customers at $12,000 a year is a company.
- Which channel you'd use. The counting method (a directory, a community, a marketplace) is usually the first acquisition channel.
Competition analysis
Graham, in the same essay: "better a good idea with competitors than a bad one without." And: "Worrying that you're late is one of the signs of a good idea." He argues that startups are rarely killed by competitors, and that a crowded market is fine if you have a thesis about what everyone in it is overlooking.
| Competitor type | Example for idea A | What to learn |
|---|---|---|
| Direct | existing migration linters and schema-review tools | their pricing, their reviews' complaints, their gaps |
| Indirect | a database platform's built-in safety features | what "good enough" looks like to buyers |
| Manual workaround | a senior engineer reviewing every migration by hand; a checklist in the PR template | the cost of the status quo, which is your price anchor |
| Do nothing | accept occasional downtime | how painful the problem really is |
COMPETITION SCAN (45 min per idea)
Alternative | Who uses it | Price | Loved for | Hated for
-------------------|-------------|-------|-----------|----------
| | | |
Our insight: what are they all overlooking? ____________________
Why they can't / won't copy it quickly: ____________________Sources: search engines, app and extension marketplaces, G2/Capterra-style review sites (sort by the 2- and 3-star reviews), Reddit and Hacker News threads, dead startups on the same idea, job postings mentioning the workaround.
The "why now?" test
Sequoia's guide Writing a Business Plan (opens in a new tab) includes a "Why now?" section: "The best companies almost always have a clear why now? Nature hates a vacuum—so why hasn't your solution been built before now?"
| Kind of "why now" | Example | Weak version |
|---|---|---|
| Technology | a capability became cheap or reliable enough (on-device models, cheap GPUs, new browser APIs) | "AI is hot" |
| Regulation | a new rule creates an obligation with a deadline | "regulation is increasing" |
| Behavior | a group now works or buys differently (remote work, usage-based pricing) | "people are more online" |
| Cost curve | something that was a service is now a product | "prices are falling" |
| Platform shift | a new distribution channel or ecosystem opened | "there's an app store for it" |
| Incumbent failure | the incumbent changed pricing or was acquired and neglected | "the incumbent is bad" |
If you can't name a specific change, the answer to "why hasn't this been built?" may be "it has, and it failed", which sends you back to the tarpit check.
Writing the problem hypothesis
The Phase 0 artifact. One page, written as hypotheses to be tested, not facts.
PROBLEM HYPOTHESIS Idea: ________ Date: ____
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT
[Customer segment] struggles to [job / outcome] because
[obstacle]. Today they [current workaround], which costs
them [time / money / risk] every [frequency].
2. TARGET CUSTOMER (one segment)
- Who (role, company size, context):
- Early adopter: people who ALREADY try to solve it, e.g.
built a script, pay for a bad tool, complain publicly
- Where they gather (communities, events, directories):
3. CURRENT ALTERNATIVES
- Direct tools:
- Workarounds (spreadsheets, scripts, people):
- Do nothing - and what that costs:
4. WHY NOW
- Specific recent change:
5. RISKIEST ASSUMPTIONS (ranked: most lethal x least evidence)
1.
2.
3.
For each: what would I have to see to believe it's false?
6. BOTTOM-UP SIZE (one line each): TAM / SAM / SOM + method
7. KILL / CONTINUE CRITERIA FOR VALIDATION (set now)
- Continue if: e.g. >= half of 10-15 interviewees raise the
problem unprompted AND >= 3 give a real commitment
- Kill if:
- Timebox: validation ends on (date):
8. PEOPLE TO TALK TO (20 names, not "people like")
Name | How I know them / how I'll reach them | Booked?A good problem statement, filled in for idea A:
Engineers at 2–20 person SaaS companies struggle to ship Postgres schema changes safely because nobody on the team is a database specialist. Today they rely on a senior engineer eyeballing migrations in review, which costs a few hours a week and, a few times a year, a production incident from a table lock.
Bad versions, and what's wrong with them:
| Bad statement | Problem |
|---|---|
| "Developers need a better way to manage databases." | no segment, no obstacle, no workaround, no cost |
| "An AI-powered migration assistant." | a solution, not a problem |
| "Database downtime costs businesses billions." | top-down theatre; not this customer |
| "Everyone who uses Postgres." | not a segment you can find or talk to |
When to kill an idea
Killing early is a skill, not a failure. Kill (or park) an idea during ideation if any of these is true:
| Kill signal | Why |
|---|---|
| you can't name 10 specific people who have the problem | you can't validate it or sell it |
| you can't describe what people do about it today | there may be no problem |
| the only people excited are friends, and they aren't the segment | false positive |
| it fails the tarpit check and you can't say why you'd succeed where others failed | the base rate is against you |
| bottom-up SOM is smaller than your minimum acceptable outcome, with no credible expansion path | even success is failure |
| you'd be bored after six months | you won't survive the trough |
| it requires regulatory approval, hardware, or a two-sided network before anyone gets value, and you have no plan for that | it doesn't fit a 6–8 week MVP; it may still be a good company |
Parking is fine: keep a "parked ideas" file with the score and the reason. Many good companies come from the second or third idea, informed by what the first one taught you.
Friction points in ideation
| Friction | What it looks like | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Endless ideation | weeks of browsing idea lists, collecting in Notion, "researching" | hard 5-day timebox; on Friday you pick the top score, full stop |
| Waiting for the perfect idea | every idea has a visible flaw, so none is chosen | all ideas have flaws; the job is to test one, not to marry it |
| Solution in search of a problem | "I want to build something with WebGPU / LLMs / CRDTs" | write the person and their painful moment first; tech goes last |
| Secrecy | not telling anyone the idea in case it's stolen | ideas are cheap, execution is not; you need to tell 20 people next week anyway |
| Novelty bias | dismissing boring ideas because they're boring | Graham and Friedman both argue boring is a positive sign |
| Competitor paralysis | finding a competitor and giving up | read their bad reviews; that's your roadmap |
| Top-down sizing | "the market is $40 billion" | count reachable customers × price |
| Analyzing instead of asking | spreadsheets of assumptions no customer has seen | the scoring matrix takes an hour; the rest is validation's job |
Exit criteria and handoff to Phase 1
PHASE 0 EXIT CHECKLIST
[ ] Idea list (30+) and scoring matrix done; weights set first
[ ] One idea chosen; others parked with scores and reasons
[ ] Tarpit and made-up checks passed (or answered in writing)
[ ] Problem hypothesis one-pager complete (template above)
[ ] Riskiest assumptions ranked; top 3 named
[ ] Bottom-up TAM/SAM/SOM with a counting method
[ ] Competition scan, including workarounds and "do nothing"
[ ] Specific "why now"
[ ] Kill/continue criteria for validation written, with numbers
[ ] 20 named people to talk to; >= 5 interviews booked
[ ] Landing page v0 live on the walking skeleton (optional
but recommended; see the playbook day plan)Handoff artifact: the problem hypothesis one-pager and the list of 20 people. Validation starts by taking the riskiest assumptions from section 5 and turning them into interview questions and smoke tests. If validation kills the idea, return here with the parked list and what you learned.
References
- Paul Graham, How to Get Startup Ideas (opens in a new tab) (November 2012): organic vs made-up ideas, "notice", live in the future, wells, schlep and unsexy filters, competition
- Paul Graham, Schlep Blindness (opens in a new tab) (January 2012): the Stripe example; "A company is defined by the schleps it will undertake"
- Paul Graham, Frighteningly Ambitious Startup Ideas (opens in a new tab) (March 2012): seven very large idea spaces
- Jared Friedman, How to Get and Evaluate Startup Ideas (opens in a new tab) (Y Combinator Startup School, 2022): ten evaluation questions, common mistakes, recipes for ideas; see also the YC Startup Library (opens in a new tab)
- Dalton Caldwell and Michael Seibel, "Avoid These Tempting Startup Ideas" (Y Combinator, 2022) and Tarpit Ideas: The Sequel (opens in a new tab): tarpit ideas
- Kevin Hale, How to Evaluate Startup Ideas (opens in a new tab) (Y Combinator Startup School): an earlier YC lecture on evaluating ideas
- Sequoia Capital, Writing a Business Plan (opens in a new tab): the "Why now?" section
- Peter Thiel with Blake Masters, Zero to One (Crown Business, 2014): secrets and contrarian insight; summarized on the peter-thiel sheet
- Clayton M. Christensen, Taddy Hall, Karen Dillon and David S. Duncan, Competing Against Luck (Harper Business, 2016): Jobs-to-be-Done framing
- Ash Maurya, Running Lean (O'Reilly, 2012) and the Lean Canvas (opens in a new tab): problem, segment, existing alternatives, riskiest assumptions
