Microeconomics
How individual households and firms make choices under scarcity, and how markets aggregate those choices into prices and quantities: supply and demand, elasticity, consumer and producer theory, market structures, game theory, factor markets and market failure. The whole-economy view (GDP, inflation, unemployment, policy) is in macroeconomics. Algebra and graph reading are on math fundamentals and reading graphs.
Core ideas
| Idea | Meaning | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Scarcity | wants exceed the resources to satisfy them | every choice has a cost |
| Opportunity cost | the value of the best alternative given up | a "free" concert costs the wage you could have earned |
| Marginal thinking | decide on the next unit: act while marginal benefit marginal cost | averages mislead; sunk costs are irrelevant |
| Incentives | people respond to changes in costs and benefits | policies change behavior, often in unintended ways |
| Trade | voluntary exchange makes both sides better off (ex ante) | specialization by comparative advantage |
| Markets | prices coordinate decentralized decisions | usually efficient; fail in specific, identifiable cases |
| Positive vs normative | "what is" (testable) vs "what ought to be" (values) | "a minimum wage raises unemployment" is positive, even if false |
| Ceteris paribus | "all else equal": vary one thing at a time | the source of the shift vs movement distinction |
A production possibilities frontier (PPF) shows the maximum combinations of two goods an economy can make with its resources and technology. Its slope is the opportunity cost of one good in terms of the other.
Comparative advantage
Absolute advantage: producing more with the same inputs. Comparative advantage: producing at a lower opportunity cost. Gains from trade come from comparative, not absolute, advantage (Ricardo, 1817).
| Output per hour | Fish | Coconuts | Opportunity cost of 1 coconut | Opportunity cost of 1 fish |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ana | 6 | 3 | 2 fish | ½ coconut |
| Ben | 2 | 2 | 1 fish | 1 coconut |
Ana has the absolute advantage in both goods, yet Ben has the comparative advantage in coconuts (1 fish versus 2). Ana specializes in fish, Ben in coconuts, and any price between 1 and 2 fish per coconut leaves both better off than self-sufficiency.
Supply and demand
Law of demand: at a higher price, buyers want less (substitution and income effects). Law of supply: at a higher price, sellers offer more (higher marginal cost of extra output is now covered).
| Demand shifts right when… | Supply shifts right when… |
|---|---|
| income rises (normal good) or falls (inferior good) | input prices fall |
| price of a substitute rises | technology improves |
| price of a complement falls | number of sellers rises |
| tastes move toward the good | expected future price falls (sell now) |
| expected future price rises (buy now) | a per-unit subsidy is paid; a tax removed |
| number of buyers rises | weather or other supply conditions improve |
A change in the good's own price moves along a curve ("quantity demanded changes"). A change in anything else shifts the curve ("demand changes").
Equilibrium: the price at which . Above it there is a surplus and the price falls; below it a shortage and the price rises.
| Shift | Price | Quantity |
|---|---|---|
| demand ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |
| demand ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| supply ↑ | ↓ | ↑ |
| supply ↓ | ↑ | ↓ |
| demand ↑ and supply ↑ | ? | ↑ |
| demand ↑ and supply ↓ | ↑ | ? |
When both curves shift, one of the two outcomes is ambiguous: it depends on which shift is larger.
Solving linear markets
With linear curves, surplus areas are triangles: , where is the demand curve's choke price (), and .
Elasticity
Elasticity is the percentage response of one variable to a 1% change in another. It is unit-free, which makes it comparable across goods.
| Elasticity | Formula | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| price elasticity of demand | negative; use | |
| price elasticity of supply | positive | |
| income elasticity | normal ( luxury), inferior | |
| cross-price elasticity | substitutes, complements | |
| midpoint (arc) method | same answer in both directions | |
| point elasticity | on a straight line, elasticity changes along it |
| Name | Price rise does to total revenue | |
|---|---|---|
| perfectly inelastic (vertical demand) | raises it proportionally | |
| inelastic | raises it | |
| unit elastic | leaves it unchanged (revenue is maximized) | |
| elastic | lowers it | |
| perfectly elastic (horizontal demand) | loses every sale |
Demand is more elastic with close substitutes, for luxuries, when the good is a large share of the budget, for narrowly defined markets ("Brand X cola" vs "drinks") and over longer time horizons. Supply is more elastic when spare capacity exists, inputs are easy to find, and over longer horizons.
Tax incidence does not depend on who legally pays. The side with the less elastic curve bears more of the tax:
Consumer choice
Consumers maximize utility subject to a budget. Only the ranking of bundles matters (ordinal utility).
| Concept | Formula | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| budget constraint | slope is the market trade-off | |
| marginal utility | usually diminishing | |
| indifference curve | bundles the consumer likes equally; cannot cross | |
| marginal rate of substitution | the personal trade-off: given up per extra | |
| optimum (interior) | , i.e. | last unit of money buys the same utility everywhere |
| Cobb–Douglas | , | constant budget shares |
A price change has two effects:
| Effect | Direction for a price fall | Why |
|---|---|---|
| substitution | always buy more of the good | it is now relatively cheaper |
| income | more if normal, less if inferior | purchasing power rose |
| total | usually more | a Giffen good (inferior, with an income effect larger than the substitution effect) is the rare exception |
Consumer surplus is willingness to pay minus the price actually paid: the area under demand and above the price.
Time and risk
| Concept | Formula | Use |
|---|---|---|
| present value | compare money at different dates | |
| net present value | invest if | |
| perpetuity | a payment forever | |
| expected value | average outcome | |
| risk aversion | concave utility: pays to insure; certainty equivalent below |
Surplus, welfare and intervention
Total surplus (CS + PS) is maximized at the competitive equilibrium when there are no externalities (the first welfare theorem). Anything that pushes quantity away from destroys surplus: the lost area is deadweight loss (DWL).
| Intervention | Effect | Welfare |
|---|---|---|
| binding price ceiling (below ) | shortage: ; queues, black markets, quality cuts | DWL; some surplus moves from sellers to lucky buyers |
| binding price floor (above ) | surplus: (e.g. unemployment under a binding minimum wage in the competitive model) | DWL; some surplus moves to sellers who still sell |
| per-unit tax | wedge: buyers pay , sellers get , quantity falls | revenue ; |
| per-unit subsidy | wedge the other way; quantity rises above | costs more than the surplus it creates |
| quota | caps quantity; creates a quota rent | DWL like a tax, rent goes to license holders |
| tariff | domestic price rises by the tariff | revenue to government, DWL from less efficient home production and lost consumption |
DWL grows with the square of the tax: doubling a tax roughly quadruples its deadweight loss, which is why broad taxes at low rates beat narrow taxes at high rates.
Production and costs
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| short run | at least one input (usually capital) is fixed |
| long run | every input is variable; firms can enter and exit |
| marginal product | extra output from one more worker; eventually diminishing |
| fixed cost | does not vary with output (rent, insurance); sunk in the short run |
| variable cost | varies with output (materials, hourly labor) |
| total cost | |
| average costs | , , |
| marginal cost | |
| accounting profit | revenue minus explicit costs |
| economic profit | revenue minus explicit and implicit (opportunity) costs; zero economic profit is a normal return |
MC crosses AVC and ATC at their minimums because an average falls while the marginal is below it and rises when the marginal is above it (like a test score pulling your average). In the drawn example, AVC bottoms out at 5.5 when and ATC at about 8.98 when .
| Long-run returns to scale | Double every input and output… | Long-run ATC |
|---|---|---|
| increasing (economies of scale) | more than doubles | falls |
| constant | doubles | flat |
| decreasing (diseconomies of scale) | less than doubles | rises |
Sources of economies of scale: specialization, spreading fixed costs (R&D, tooling), bulk buying, network effects. Diseconomies: coordination and management costs. Minimum efficient scale is the smallest output at which long-run ATC is at its minimum; relative to market size it decides how many firms an industry can support.
Market structures
Every profit-maximizing firm produces where marginal revenue equals marginal cost (), then charges the highest price demand allows at that quantity.
| Perfect competition | Monopolistic competition | Oligopoly | Monopoly | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firms | very many | many | few, interdependent | one |
| Product | identical | differentiated | identical or differentiated | unique, no close substitute |
| Entry barriers | none | low | high | very high (legal, scale, network, control of an input) |
| Firm's demand | horizontal at market price () | downward sloping | depends on rivals' actions | market demand () |
| Price | (varies with conduct) | |||
| Long-run profit | zero | zero (entry erodes it) | can persist | can persist |
| Efficiency | allocatively and productively efficient | excess capacity, variety | anywhere from competitive to monopoly | DWL |
| Examples | wheat, forex | restaurants, clothing | airlines, telecoms, cloud | local water utility, patented drug |
Perfect competition, short run: produce where if ; otherwise shut down (lose only the fixed cost). Long run: exit if . The firm's short-run supply curve is its MC curve above min AVC. Long-run equilibrium: , zero economic profit.
Monopoly: with linear demand , revenue is and (twice as steep as demand). A monopolist never operates on the inelastic part of demand. Its markup follows the Lerner index:
| Price discrimination | How | Example |
|---|---|---|
| first degree (perfect) | each buyer pays their willingness to pay; no DWL, no CS | individually negotiated prices, personalized pricing |
| second degree | price varies with quantity or version; buyers self-select | bulk discounts, economy vs business class |
| third degree | different prices for identifiable groups; higher price to the less elastic group | student and senior discounts, geographic pricing |
Market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index: the sum of squared market shares in percent (monopoly = 10,000). The 2023 US Merger Guidelines treat markets above 1,800 as highly concentrated and presume a merger that raises HHI by more than 100 in such a market substantially lessens competition.
Game theory and oligopoly
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| dominant strategy | best reply whatever the others do |
| Nash equilibrium | every player's strategy is a best reply to the others'; nobody gains by deviating alone |
| Pareto efficient | no one can be made better off without making someone worse off |
| repeated game | cooperation can be sustained by threat of punishment (tit-for-tat, grim trigger) if players value the future enough |
| sequential game | solve by backward induction from the last move |
| credible threat | one the player would actually carry out when the time comes |
The prisoner's dilemma: payoffs (row, column), higher is better.
| Column: cooperate | Column: defect | |
|---|---|---|
| Row: cooperate | 3, 3 | 0, 5 |
| Row: defect | 5, 0 | 1, 1 |
Defect is dominant for both, so (defect, defect) is the unique Nash equilibrium, although (cooperate, cooperate) is better for both. This is the logic of cartels breaking down, arms races, overfishing and advertising wars.
| Oligopoly model | Firms choose | Outcome with identical firms |
|---|---|---|
| Cournot | quantities, simultaneously | between monopoly and competition; approaches as the number of firms grows |
| Bertrand | prices, identical products | even with two firms |
| Stackelberg | quantities, leader then follower | leader produces more and earns more than in Cournot |
| cartel / collusion | joint output | monopoly outcome, unstable because each member gains by cheating |
With identical Cournot firms facing and constant marginal cost , each produces .
Factor markets
Firms hire an input until the extra revenue it brings equals its price.
| Concept | Formula |
|---|---|
| marginal revenue product of labor | |
| competitive product market | |
| hiring rule | hire while ; the MRP curve is the firm's labor demand |
| cost-minimizing input mix | |
| labor supply | substitution effect (work more at a higher wage) vs income effect (buy more leisure); can bend backwards |
Monopsony, a single (or dominant) buyer of labor, pays less than MRP and hires fewer workers than a competitive market, because hiring one more worker raises the wage for all. In that model a minimum wage set between the monopsony wage and the competitive wage can raise both pay and employment, which is one reason empirical studies of moderate minimum wages often find small employment effects.
Economic rent is payment above what is needed to keep a factor in its current use (a star's pay above their next-best job). Taxing pure rent causes no deadweight loss.
Market failure
| Failure | Mechanism | Remedies |
|---|---|---|
| negative externality | a cost falls on third parties: pollution, congestion; market output too high | Pigouvian tax equal to marginal external cost at the efficient quantity, cap-and-trade, regulation |
| positive externality | benefits spill over: vaccination, R&D, education; output too low | subsidies, public provision, patents |
| public good | non-rival and non-excludable (defense, basic research, lighthouses): free riding | tax-funded provision |
| common resource | rival but non-excludable (fisheries, groundwater): overuse, the tragedy of the commons | quotas, property rights, community governance (Ostrom) |
| asymmetric information | one side knows more | disclosure rules, warranties, signaling, screening |
| adverse selection | hidden type before a deal: only high-risk buyers want insurance, only lemons get sold (Akerlof) | mandates, pooling, screening, certification |
| moral hazard | hidden action after a deal: insured people take more risks | deductibles, co-pays, monitoring, incentive pay |
| principal–agent | the agent's goals differ from the principal's | performance pay, equity, contracts |
| market power | antitrust, regulation of natural monopolies |
| Goods | Excludable | Non-excludable |
|---|---|---|
| Rival | private goods (food, clothes) | common resources (fish stocks) |
| Non-rival | club goods (streaming, toll roads when uncongested) | public goods (defense, public-domain knowledge) |
The Coase theorem: if property rights are clear and transaction costs are low, private bargaining reaches the efficient outcome whoever holds the rights (the allocation of rights changes who pays, not what is produced). With many parties or high transaction costs, it breaks down, which is why pollution needs policy.
Government failure is also real: regulatory capture, rent seeking, lobbying for concentrated benefits with dispersed costs, and imperfect information on the policymaker's side.
Behavioral economics
| Finding | Meaning |
|---|---|
| loss aversion | losses hurt more than equal gains please; estimates cluster around 2× (prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky) |
| reference dependence | outcomes judged as gains or losses relative to a reference point, not as final wealth |
| present bias | overweighting now relative to later (hyperbolic discounting): under-saving, procrastination |
| anchoring | irrelevant numbers bias estimates |
| mental accounting | money treated differently by label ("bonus", "rent money") despite being fungible |
| default effects | people stick with the pre-set option: auto-enrollment raises pension participation |
| bounded rationality | limited attention and computing power; people satisfice rather than optimize |
Worked examples
Equilibrium, surplus and a tax
Demand , supply .
Choke price , lowest supply price :
Now a tax of 6 per unit is levied on sellers, so supply becomes :
| Before | After | |
|---|---|---|
| consumer surplus | 900 | |
| producer surplus | 450 | |
| tax revenue | 0 | |
| total | 1350 | 1326 |
| deadweight loss |
Buyers pay 4 of the 6 and sellers 2: supply's slope in -per- (4) is twice demand's (2), so the less responsive side, demand, carries two thirds.
Elasticity and revenue
A café raises a coffee from 4 to 6 and daily sales fall from 120 to 90. Midpoint elasticity:
Inelastic, so revenue rises: becomes .
Monopoly vs competition
Demand , constant , no fixed cost.
| Monopoly | Competition | |
|---|---|---|
| rule | ||
| quantity | 40 | 80 |
| price | 60 | 20 |
| profit | 0 | |
| consumer surplus | ||
| deadweight loss | 0 |
Check with Lerner: at , and . Two Cournot firms would each produce , for and : between the two.
Utility maximization
, income 100, , . Cobb–Douglas spends half the budget on each good: , . Check: .
Shut down or stay open?
Using the cost curves drawn above (, ) in a competitive market:
| Market price | Short run | Long run |
|---|---|---|
| 12 | produce where ; economic profit | entry pushes the price down |
| 7 | produce: covers AVC and part of FC; loss smaller than FC | exit unless the price recovers |
| 5 | shut down: price below min AVC, lose only FC | exit |
References
- OpenStax: Principles of Microeconomics 3e (opens in a new tab): free introductory textbook, source of the standard definitions used here
- CORE Econ: The Economy 2.0 (opens in a new tab): free, modern, data-driven introduction
- Marginal Revolution University (opens in a new tab): short videos on every principles topic
- Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, 9th ed. (W. W. Norton, 2014): consumer and producer theory with calculus
- N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Cengage): the standard principles text
- Akerlof (1970), The Market for "Lemons" (opens in a new tab), Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): adverse selection
- Coase (1960), The Problem of Social Cost (opens in a new tab), Journal of Law and Economics 3: bargaining and externalities
- Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Prospect Theory (opens in a new tab), Econometrica 47(2): loss aversion and reference dependence
- US DOJ and FTC: 2023 Merger Guidelines (opens in a new tab): HHI thresholds
- Macroeconomics: the companion sheet