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Microeconomics

How individual households and firms make choices under scarcity, and how markets aggregate those choices into prices and quantities: supply and demand, elasticity, consumer and producer theory, market structures, game theory, factor markets and market failure. The whole-economy view (GDP, inflation, unemployment, policy) is in macroeconomics. Algebra and graph reading are on math fundamentals and reading graphs.

Core ideas

IdeaMeaningConsequence
Scarcitywants exceed the resources to satisfy themevery choice has a cost
Opportunity costthe value of the best alternative given upa "free" concert costs the wage you could have earned
Marginal thinkingdecide on the next unit: act while marginal benefit ≥\ge marginal costaverages mislead; sunk costs are irrelevant
Incentivespeople respond to changes in costs and benefitspolicies change behavior, often in unintended ways
Tradevoluntary exchange makes both sides better off (ex ante)specialization by comparative advantage
Marketsprices coordinate decentralized decisionsusually efficient; fail in specific, identifiable cases
Positive vs normative"what is" (testable) vs "what ought to be" (values)"a minimum wage raises unemployment" is positive, even if false
Ceteris paribus"all else equal": vary one thing at a timethe source of the shift vs movement distinction

A production possibilities frontier (PPF) shows the maximum combinations of two goods an economy can make with its resources and technology. Its slope is the opportunity cost of one good in terms of the other.

food computers A: efficient (on the frontier) B: inefficient (idle resources) C: unattainable today PPF after growth bowed out: each extra computer costs more food (increasing opportunity cost)
A PPF: efficient, inefficient and unattainable points, and growth shifting the frontier out

Comparative advantage

Absolute advantage: producing more with the same inputs. Comparative advantage: producing at a lower opportunity cost. Gains from trade come from comparative, not absolute, advantage (Ricardo, 1817).

Output per hourFishCoconutsOpportunity cost of 1 coconutOpportunity cost of 1 fish
Ana632 fish½ coconut
Ben221 fish1 coconut

Ana has the absolute advantage in both goods, yet Ben has the comparative advantage in coconuts (1 fish versus 2). Ana specializes in fish, Ben in coconuts, and any price between 1 and 2 fish per coconut leaves both better off than self-sufficiency.

Supply and demand

Law of demand: at a higher price, buyers want less (substitution and income effects). Law of supply: at a higher price, sellers offer more (higher marginal cost of extra output is now covered).

Demand shifts right when…Supply shifts right when…
income rises (normal good) or falls (inferior good)input prices fall
price of a substitute risestechnology improves
price of a complement fallsnumber of sellers rises
tastes move toward the goodexpected future price falls (sell now)
expected future price rises (buy now)a per-unit subsidy is paid; a tax removed
number of buyers risesweather or other supply conditions improve

A change in the good's own price moves along a curve ("quantity demanded changes"). A change in anything else shifts the curve ("demand changes").

price P quantity Q D S E: equilibrium P* Q* consumer surplus producer surplus
Market equilibrium, consumer surplus and producer surplus

Equilibrium: the price at which Qd=QsQ_d = Q_s. Above it there is a surplus and the price falls; below it a shortage and the price rises.

ShiftPriceQuantity
demand ↑↑↑
demand ↓↓↓
supply ↑↓↑
supply ↓↑↓
demand ↑ and supply ↑?↑
demand ↑ and supply ↓↑?

When both curves shift, one of the two outcomes is ambiguous: it depends on which shift is larger.

Solving linear markets

Qd=a−bP,Qs=c+dP⇒P∗=a−cb+d,Q∗=a−bP∗Q_d = a - bP, \qquad Q_s = c + dP \quad\Rightarrow\quad P^* = \frac{a - c}{b + d}, \qquad Q^* = a - bP^*

With linear curves, surplus areas are triangles: CS=12 Q∗(Pmax−P∗)\text{CS} = \tfrac12\,Q^*(P_\text{max} - P^*), where PmaxP_\text{max} is the demand curve's choke price (Qd=0Q_d = 0), and PS=12 Q∗(P∗−Pmin)\text{PS} = \tfrac12\,Q^*(P^* - P_\text{min}).

Elasticity

Elasticity is the percentage response of one variable to a 1% change in another. It is unit-free, which makes it comparable across goods.

ElasticityFormulaReading
price elasticity of demandEd=%ΔQd%ΔPE_d = \dfrac{\%\Delta Q_d}{\%\Delta P}negative; use ∣Ed∣\lvert E_d \rvert
price elasticity of supplyEs=%ΔQs%ΔPE_s = \dfrac{\%\Delta Q_s}{\%\Delta P}positive
income elasticityEI=%ΔQd%ΔIE_I = \dfrac{\%\Delta Q_d}{\%\Delta I}>0> 0 normal (>1> 1 luxury), <0< 0 inferior
cross-price elasticityExy=%ΔQx%ΔPyE_{xy} = \dfrac{\%\Delta Q_x}{\%\Delta P_y}>0> 0 substitutes, <0< 0 complements
midpoint (arc) method(Q2−Q1)/Qˉ(P2−P1)/Pˉ\dfrac{(Q_2 - Q_1)/\bar Q}{(P_2 - P_1)/\bar P}same answer in both directions
point elasticityE=dQdP⋅PQE = \dfrac{dQ}{dP}\cdot\dfrac{P}{Q}on a straight line, elasticity changes along it
∣Ed∣\lvert E_d \rvertNamePrice rise does to total revenue P×QP \times Q
00perfectly inelastic (vertical demand)raises it proportionally
<1< 1inelasticraises it
=1= 1unit elasticleaves it unchanged (revenue is maximized)
>1> 1elasticlowers it
∞\inftyperfectly elastic (horizontal demand)loses every sale

Demand is more elastic with close substitutes, for luxuries, when the good is a large share of the budget, for narrowly defined markets ("Brand X cola" vs "drinks") and over longer time horizons. Supply is more elastic when spare capacity exists, inputs are easy to find, and over longer horizons.

Tax incidence does not depend on who legally pays. The side with the less elastic curve bears more of the tax:

buyers’ share=EsEs+∣Ed∣,sellers’ share=∣Ed∣Es+∣Ed∣\text{buyers' share} = \frac{E_s}{E_s + \lvert E_d \rvert}, \qquad \text{sellers' share} = \frac{\lvert E_d \rvert}{E_s + \lvert E_d \rvert}

Consumer choice

Consumers maximize utility subject to a budget. Only the ranking of bundles matters (ordinal utility).

ConceptFormulaMeaning
budget constraintpxx+pyy=Ip_x x + p_y y = Islope −px/py-p_x/p_y is the market trade-off
marginal utilityMUx=∂U/∂xMU_x = \partial U / \partial xusually diminishing
indifference curveU(x,y)=UˉU(x, y) = \bar Ubundles the consumer likes equally; cannot cross
marginal rate of substitutionMRS=MUxMUyMRS = \dfrac{MU_x}{MU_y}the personal trade-off: yy given up per extra xx
optimum (interior)MRS=pxpyMRS = \dfrac{p_x}{p_y}, i.e. MUxpx=MUypy\dfrac{MU_x}{p_x} = \dfrac{MU_y}{p_y}last unit of money buys the same utility everywhere
Cobb–Douglas U=xαy1−αU = x^\alpha y^{1-\alpha}x=αIpxx = \dfrac{\alpha I}{p_x}, y=(1−α)Ipyy = \dfrac{(1-\alpha) I}{p_y}constant budget shares

A price change has two effects:

EffectDirection for a price fallWhy
substitutionalways buy more of the goodit is now relatively cheaper
incomemore if normal, less if inferiorpurchasing power rose
totalusually morea Giffen good (inferior, with an income effect larger than the substitution effect) is the rare exception

Consumer surplus is willingness to pay minus the price actually paid: the area under demand and above the price.

Time and risk

ConceptFormulaUse
present valuePV=FV(1+r)tPV = \dfrac{FV}{(1 + r)^t}compare money at different dates
net present valueNPV=∑t=0TCFt(1+r)tNPV = \displaystyle\sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{CF_t}{(1 + r)^t}invest if NPV>0NPV > 0
perpetuityPV=CrPV = \dfrac{C}{r}a payment CC forever
expected valueE[X]=∑pixiE[X] = \sum p_i x_iaverage outcome
risk aversionU(E[X])>E[U(X)]U(E[X]) > E[U(X)]concave utility: pays to insure; certainty equivalent below E[X]E[X]

Surplus, welfare and intervention

Total surplus (CS + PS) is maximized at the competitive equilibrium when there are no externalities (the first welfare theorem). Anything that pushes quantity away from Q∗Q^* destroys surplus: the lost area is deadweight loss (DWL).

InterventionEffectWelfare
binding price ceiling (below P∗P^*)shortage: Qd>QsQ_d > Q_s; queues, black markets, quality cutsDWL; some surplus moves from sellers to lucky buyers
binding price floor (above P∗P^*)surplus: Qs>QdQ_s > Q_d (e.g. unemployment under a binding minimum wage in the competitive model)DWL; some surplus moves to sellers who still sell
per-unit tax ttwedge: buyers pay PbP_b, sellers get Ps=Pb−tP_s = P_b - t, quantity fallsrevenue t×Qtt \times Q_t; DWL=12 t (Q∗−Qt)\text{DWL} = \tfrac12\,t\,(Q^* - Q_t)
per-unit subsidywedge the other way; quantity rises above Q∗Q^*costs more than the surplus it creates
quotacaps quantity; creates a quota rentDWL like a tax, rent goes to license holders
tariffdomestic price rises by the tariffrevenue to government, DWL from less efficient home production and lost consumption

DWL grows with the square of the tax: doubling a tax roughly quadruples its deadweight loss, which is why broad taxes at low rates beat narrow taxes at high rates.

Production and costs

TermDefinition
short runat least one input (usually capital) is fixed
long runevery input is variable; firms can enter and exit
marginal product MPLMP_Lextra output from one more worker; eventually diminishing
fixed cost FCFCdoes not vary with output (rent, insurance); sunk in the short run
variable cost VC(Q)VC(Q)varies with output (materials, hourly labor)
total costTC=FC+VCTC = FC + VC
average costsAFC=FC/QAFC = FC/Q, AVC=VC/QAVC = VC/Q, ATC=TC/Q=AFC+AVCATC = TC/Q = AFC + AVC
marginal costMC=ΔTC/ΔQ=dTC/dQMC = \Delta TC / \Delta Q = dTC/dQ
accounting profitrevenue minus explicit costs
economic profitrevenue minus explicit and implicit (opportunity) costs; zero economic profit is a normal return
cost per unit output Q MC ATC AVC AFC efficient scale
Short-run cost curves: MC cuts AVC and ATC at their minimums (drawn from VC = 10Q − 1.2Q² + 0.08Q³, FC = 30)

MC crosses AVC and ATC at their minimums because an average falls while the marginal is below it and rises when the marginal is above it (like a test score pulling your average). In the drawn example, AVC bottoms out at 5.5 when Q=7.5Q = 7.5 and ATC at about 8.98 when Q≈9.55Q \approx 9.55.

Long-run returns to scaleDouble every input and output…Long-run ATC
increasing (economies of scale)more than doublesfalls
constantdoublesflat
decreasing (diseconomies of scale)less than doublesrises

Sources of economies of scale: specialization, spreading fixed costs (R&D, tooling), bulk buying, network effects. Diseconomies: coordination and management costs. Minimum efficient scale is the smallest output at which long-run ATC is at its minimum; relative to market size it decides how many firms an industry can support.

Market structures

Every profit-maximizing firm produces where marginal revenue equals marginal cost (MR=MCMR = MC), then charges the highest price demand allows at that quantity.

Perfect competitionMonopolistic competitionOligopolyMonopoly
Firmsvery manymanyfew, interdependentone
Productidenticaldifferentiatedidentical or differentiatedunique, no close substitute
Entry barriersnonelowhighvery high (legal, scale, network, control of an input)
Firm's demandhorizontal at market price (P=MRP = MR)downward slopingdepends on rivals' actionsmarket demand (MR<PMR < P)
PriceP=MCP = MCP>MCP > MCP>MCP > MC (varies with conduct)P>MCP > MC
Long-run profitzerozero (entry erodes it)can persistcan persist
Efficiencyallocatively and productively efficientexcess capacity, varietyanywhere from competitive to monopolyDWL
Exampleswheat, forexrestaurants, clothingairlines, telecoms, cloudlocal water utility, patented drug

Perfect competition, short run: produce where P=MCP = MC if P≥min⁡AVCP \ge \min AVC; otherwise shut down (lose only the fixed cost). Long run: exit if P<min⁡ATCP < \min ATC. The firm's short-run supply curve is its MC curve above min AVC. Long-run equilibrium: P=MC=min⁡ATCP = MC = \min ATC, zero economic profit.

Monopoly: with linear demand P=a−bQP = a - bQ, revenue is aQ−bQ2aQ - bQ^2 and MR=a−2bQMR = a - 2bQ (twice as steep as demand). A monopolist never operates on the inelastic part of demand. Its markup follows the Lerner index:

L=P−MCP=1∣Ed∣L = \frac{P - MC}{P} = \frac{1}{\lvert E_d \rvert}
Price discriminationHowExample
first degree (perfect)each buyer pays their willingness to pay; no DWL, no CSindividually negotiated prices, personalized pricing
second degreeprice varies with quantity or version; buyers self-selectbulk discounts, economy vs business class
third degreedifferent prices for identifiable groups; higher price to the less elastic groupstudent and senior discounts, geographic pricing

Market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index: the sum of squared market shares in percent (monopoly = 10,000). The 2023 US Merger Guidelines treat markets above 1,800 as highly concentrated and presume a merger that raises HHI by more than 100 in such a market substantially lessens competition.

Game theory and oligopoly

TermMeaning
dominant strategybest reply whatever the others do
Nash equilibriumevery player's strategy is a best reply to the others'; nobody gains by deviating alone
Pareto efficientno one can be made better off without making someone worse off
repeated gamecooperation can be sustained by threat of punishment (tit-for-tat, grim trigger) if players value the future enough
sequential gamesolve by backward induction from the last move
credible threatone the player would actually carry out when the time comes

The prisoner's dilemma: payoffs (row, column), higher is better.

Column: cooperateColumn: defect
Row: cooperate3, 30, 5
Row: defect5, 01, 1

Defect is dominant for both, so (defect, defect) is the unique Nash equilibrium, although (cooperate, cooperate) is better for both. This is the logic of cartels breaking down, arms races, overfishing and advertising wars.

Oligopoly modelFirms chooseOutcome with identical firms
Cournotquantities, simultaneouslybetween monopoly and competition; approaches P=MCP = MC as the number of firms grows
Bertrandprices, identical productsP=MCP = MC even with two firms
Stackelbergquantities, leader then followerleader produces more and earns more than in Cournot
cartel / collusionjoint outputmonopoly outcome, unstable because each member gains by cheating

With nn identical Cournot firms facing P=a−bQP = a - bQ and constant marginal cost cc, each produces q=a−c(n+1)bq = \dfrac{a - c}{(n + 1)b}.

Factor markets

Firms hire an input until the extra revenue it brings equals its price.

ConceptFormula
marginal revenue product of laborMRPL=MPL×MRMRP_L = MP_L \times MR
competitive product marketMRPL=VMPL=P×MPLMRP_L = VMP_L = P \times MP_L
hiring rulehire while MRPL≥wMRP_L \ge w; the MRP curve is the firm's labor demand
cost-minimizing input mixMPLw=MPKr\dfrac{MP_L}{w} = \dfrac{MP_K}{r}
labor supplysubstitution effect (work more at a higher wage) vs income effect (buy more leisure); can bend backwards

Monopsony, a single (or dominant) buyer of labor, pays less than MRP and hires fewer workers than a competitive market, because hiring one more worker raises the wage for all. In that model a minimum wage set between the monopsony wage and the competitive wage can raise both pay and employment, which is one reason empirical studies of moderate minimum wages often find small employment effects.

Economic rent is payment above what is needed to keep a factor in its current use (a star's pay above their next-best job). Taxing pure rent causes no deadweight loss.

Market failure

FailureMechanismRemedies
negative externalitya cost falls on third parties: pollution, congestion; market output too highPigouvian tax equal to marginal external cost at the efficient quantity, cap-and-trade, regulation
positive externalitybenefits spill over: vaccination, R&D, education; output too lowsubsidies, public provision, patents
public goodnon-rival and non-excludable (defense, basic research, lighthouses): free ridingtax-funded provision
common resourcerival but non-excludable (fisheries, groundwater): overuse, the tragedy of the commonsquotas, property rights, community governance (Ostrom)
asymmetric informationone side knows moredisclosure rules, warranties, signaling, screening
adverse selectionhidden type before a deal: only high-risk buyers want insurance, only lemons get sold (Akerlof)mandates, pooling, screening, certification
moral hazardhidden action after a deal: insured people take more risksdeductibles, co-pays, monitoring, incentive pay
principal–agentthe agent's goals differ from the principal'sperformance pay, equity, contracts
market powerP>MCP > MCantitrust, regulation of natural monopolies
GoodsExcludableNon-excludable
Rivalprivate goods (food, clothes)common resources (fish stocks)
Non-rivalclub goods (streaming, toll roads when uncongested)public goods (defense, public-domain knowledge)

The Coase theorem: if property rights are clear and transaction costs are low, private bargaining reaches the efficient outcome whoever holds the rights (the allocation of rights changes who pays, not what is produced). With many parties or high transaction costs, it breaks down, which is why pollution needs policy.

Government failure is also real: regulatory capture, rent seeking, lobbying for concentrated benefits with dispersed costs, and imperfect information on the policymaker's side.

Behavioral economics

FindingMeaning
loss aversionlosses hurt more than equal gains please; estimates cluster around 2× (prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky)
reference dependenceoutcomes judged as gains or losses relative to a reference point, not as final wealth
present biasoverweighting now relative to later (hyperbolic discounting): under-saving, procrastination
anchoringirrelevant numbers bias estimates
mental accountingmoney treated differently by label ("bonus", "rent money") despite being fungible
default effectspeople stick with the pre-set option: auto-enrollment raises pension participation
bounded rationalitylimited attention and computing power; people satisfice rather than optimize

Worked examples

Equilibrium, surplus and a tax

Demand Qd=100−2PQ_d = 100 - 2P, supply Qs=−20+4PQ_s = -20 + 4P.

100−2P=−20+4P⇒P∗=20,Q∗=60100 - 2P = -20 + 4P \Rightarrow P^* = 20, \quad Q^* = 60

Choke price Pmax=50P_\text{max} = 50, lowest supply price Pmin=5P_\text{min} = 5:

CS=12(60)(50−20)=900,PS=12(60)(20−5)=450\text{CS} = \tfrac12(60)(50 - 20) = 900, \qquad \text{PS} = \tfrac12(60)(20 - 5) = 450

Now a tax of 6 per unit is levied on sellers, so supply becomes Qs=−20+4(Pb−6)Q_s = -20 + 4(P_b - 6):

100−2Pb=−44+4Pb⇒Pb=24,Ps=18,Qt=52100 - 2P_b = -44 + 4P_b \Rightarrow P_b = 24, \quad P_s = 18, \quad Q_t = 52
BeforeAfter
consumer surplus90012(52)(26)=676\tfrac12(52)(26) = 676
producer surplus45012(52)(13)=338\tfrac12(52)(13) = 338
tax revenue06×52=3126 \times 52 = 312
total13501326
deadweight loss12(6)(60−52)=24\tfrac12(6)(60 - 52) = 24

Buyers pay 4 of the 6 and sellers 2: supply's slope in QQ-per-PP (4) is twice demand's (2), so the less responsive side, demand, carries two thirds.

Elasticity and revenue

A café raises a coffee from 4 to 6 and daily sales fall from 120 to 90. Midpoint elasticity:

Ed=(90−120)/105(6−4)/5=−0.2860.40=−0.71E_d = \frac{(90 - 120)/105}{(6 - 4)/5} = \frac{-0.286}{0.40} = -0.71

Inelastic, so revenue rises: 4×120=4804 \times 120 = 480 becomes 6×90=5406 \times 90 = 540.

Monopoly vs competition

Demand P=100−QP = 100 - Q, constant MC=20MC = 20, no fixed cost.

MonopolyCompetition
ruleMR=100−2Q=20MR = 100 - 2Q = 20P=MC=20P = MC = 20
quantity4080
price6020
profit(60−20)(40)=1600(60 - 20)(40) = 16000
consumer surplus12(40)(40)=800\tfrac12(40)(40) = 80012(80)(80)=3200\tfrac12(80)(80) = 3200
deadweight loss12(60−20)(80−40)=800\tfrac12(60 - 20)(80 - 40) = 8000

Check with Lerner: at Q=40Q = 40, ∣Ed∣=1⋅60/40=1.5\lvert E_d \rvert = 1 \cdot 60/40 = 1.5 and (60−20)/60=2/3=1/1.5(60 - 20)/60 = 2/3 = 1/1.5. Two Cournot firms would each produce 80/3≈26.780/3 \approx 26.7, for Q≈53.3Q \approx 53.3 and P≈46.7P \approx 46.7: between the two.

Utility maximization

U=x0.5y0.5U = x^{0.5} y^{0.5}, income 100, px=2p_x = 2, py=5p_y = 5. Cobb–Douglas spends half the budget on each good: x=50/2=25x = 50/2 = 25, y=50/5=10y = 50/5 = 10. Check: MRS=y/x=10/25=0.4=px/pyMRS = y/x = 10/25 = 0.4 = p_x/p_y.

Shut down or stay open?

Using the cost curves drawn above (min⁡AVC=5.5\min AVC = 5.5, min⁡ATC≈8.98\min ATC \approx 8.98) in a competitive market:

Market priceShort runLong run
12produce where P=MCP = MC; economic profitentry pushes the price down
7produce: covers AVC and part of FC; loss smaller than FCexit unless the price recovers
5shut down: price below min AVC, lose only FCexit

References